Abstract
Introduction
Traditional systems are essentially centralized and always be the targets of intrusion attacks. According to the intruder privileges, intruders can be external intruders or internal intruders. Their intrusion goals include disclosing confidential information, creating false information or altering or destroying sensitive information, even preventing legitimate users from using the system.
Due to the Denial of Service and other fatal Internet intrusions, traditional centralized systems tend to adopt distributed architectures. There are two implement methods for an intrusion tolerance system. One is attack response method which mainly depends on the detection or evaluation of attack activities. By detecting of the part failure of the system or anticipating the coming intrusions, the system will re-distribute the resources, recompose the modules or recover to the previous valid state. The other is attack masking method, which need to redesign the whole system. The most common technique is fault tolerance, which adds redundancy to the system. Simple redundancy is not enough, an intrusion tolerance distributed system demands more sophisticated architecture and algorithms. Multi-party computing, threshold cryptography and Byzantine Protocol technology are becoming the primary theories, which support the same essential hypothesis, the computing environment is not trustable. An intrusion tolerance distributed system is to design a kind of architecture which enables trusted partial systems cooperating securely under insecure networks.
There are two important characteristics of an intrusion tolerance distributed system. The first is its effort to avoid all the single-point triggered system-crashing, which means any single-point-failure won't impact the normal operation of it. The second is that it's capability to resist to inner crimes. Attacks especially those from inner intruders can not be totally eradicated. By rightdecentralization and single-point-failure prevention, a system can tolerance fewer devices, network nodes or administers betray together. Not all the entities are demanded to be honest as long as a majority of them can be trusted.
For critical infrastructures, any single-point-failure will endanger the whole system. For both B/S and C/S modes, almost all security relevant operations are always run by servers, for example the sensitive data will be stored or processed by servers.
In this proceeding, we will introduce two intrusion tolerance distributed systems under-developing: one is an intrusion tolerance CA system, the other is a survivable repository.
Intrusion tolerance CA System
Certification Authorities (CA) are a critical component of a PKI. All the certificates issued by a CA will become invalid when the (signing) private key of the CA is compromised. Hence it is a very important issue to protect the private key of an online CA. Our intrusion tolerance CA systems, built on top of threshold cryptography, ensure the security of a CA through a series of defense-in-depth protections. The CA systems won't be compromised when a few system components are compromised or some system administrators betray. The private key of a CA is protected by distributing different shares of the key to different (signing) components and by ensuring that any component of the CA is unable to reconstruct the private key.
The basic idea of our CA system is to distribute the certificate signing task from a single CA signing server to a set of share servers and a set of combiners. It is designed to counter two types of attacks: (a) an outsider attack may break into a CA; the hacker could obtain the server resources and thus find the private key of CA or find the way to lead to or make use of the private key; (b) An employee, who has control of part of a CA, wants to figure out what is the private key of the CA.
In addition, a multi-layer CA protection architecture of our system makes it very difficult to attack from outside. We divide the set of our CA system components into some levels or zones based on the procedure of signature composition and the relation among these components.
The multi-level security control requirements of our CA system are as follows: (a) the connections among zones should be strictly controlled in such a way that the whole CA system can only be compromised zone by zone. That is, a compromised level L component can only be used to compromise a level L+1 component, and it is impossible for the level L component to directly break into any component on a level higher than L+1. For example, a L-1 zone attacker has to occupy and control at least a component in the L zone in order to break into a component in the L+1 zone. (b) Each security level should carry out an independent security strategy. Different zones should be protected in different ways. In this way, the vulnerabilities of one zone are of minimum utility for the attacker to attack another zone.
Our CA system satisfies the multi-level security control requirements by a set of specifically configured firewalls attached directly to each component.
Survivable repository
Repository is another critical component of a PKI, it stores and propagates users' certificates and CRL in a real-time manner. The goal of survivable repository is to fulfill its mission in a timely manner, with the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.
Our repository utilized ideals of Byzantine Quorum System to achieve its goal. The Byzantine Quorum system makes no security assumptions of any servers and relies on part of the whole system in each operation, thus it is feasible and efficient. At the other hand, online services accessible on the Internet demands highlyavailable systems that provide service without interruptions. The Byzantine Quorum system presumes asynchronous communication thus accords with the actual Internet environment.
In addition, the access protocols are designed with no assumption about communication channels and can resist denial-of-service attacks, differ from a general dissemination quorum system which only assure correct responses from the system
Summary
In the environment with high-frequent malicious attacks, intrusion tolerance will be one of essential features of future distributed systems whose components cannot be all trusted.
Threshold cryptography, Byzantine Quorum system and other theories contribute to the foundation of these systems. But building real intrusion tolerance distributed system is not very popular partly because there is no very clear ROI model of such systems. How much intrusion tolerance would I need?
We will continue our research in this area in two directions:
Building more general intrusion tolerance distributed systems. finding criteria to assess such system.
